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Abstract
As a central dimension of the Human experi-
ence, the conception of time has undergone
deep transformations during the Renaissance
period, in relationship with global evolutions
in European arts, sciences, and metaphysics.
The Aristotelian deﬁnition of time as “a num-
ber of motion in respect to before and after”
was challenged to open the way to an ontolog-
ical determination of time, independent from
motion and connected to the divine structure of
beings in the universe. From Ficino to most
innovative thinkers like Telesio, Patrizi. Bruno
in particular introduced a relativistic perspec-
tive and showed that we should rather speak of
a multiplicity of times. The reﬂection on the
difference between time and duration has been
another technical issue developed by Renais-
sance thinkers: since time was nomore referred
to the Ptolemaic cosmos, the concept of dura-
tion was used to designate the internal time of
things and existing beings, as Suarez makes
clear at the beginning of seventeenth century.
This idea of time as an inner reality also had
important applications in the ﬁeld of literature
and moral philosophy, as we see for instance in
Shakespeare and Montaigne. Although Mod-
ern Philosophers like Descartes or Pascal seem
to break with the scholastic approach of time, it
is interesting to note that the pre-Newtonian
concept of “absolute time” is rooted in Renais-
sance theories of time and the development of
Copernicanism leading to the construction of a
new reference frame, where the Suarezian
“imaginary time” plays a central role.
Heritage and Rupture with the Tradition
More than in any other period in the history of
thought, the complexity and the fallibility of the
philosophical deﬁnitions of time have been the
object of close scrutiny during the Renaissance.
While most of medieval thinkers concentrate on
Aristotle’s Physics IV, 10–14, and tackle obscuri-
ties or objections that can be raised about the
Aristotelian conception of time, the rise of human-
ist scholarship combined with a renewed access to
ancient doctrines (Neoplatonism, but also Epicu-
reanism, Stoicism, or Averroism) broadens the
ﬁeld of available references and leads Renais-
sance thinkers to question the authority of the
Aristotelian framework. Far from disappearing
outright, the medieval language of time maintains
itself in those debates: the distinction between the
three modes of duration, eternity (æternitas), per-
petuity (ævum), and time (tempus) as introduced
in the course of the thirteenth century by the
Summa Halensis, still informs theoretical
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inquiries. But during the Renaissance, the philo-
sophical study of time aims not so much at solving
problems of interpretation raised by Aristotle’s
texts as at helping to build a global and coherent
view of the cosmos. Insofar as Neoplatonism pro-
vides a system of thought where time is primarily
referred to eternity and motion is secondary to
time itself, Aristotle’s canonical deﬁnition of
time as “a number of motion in respect to before
and after” is indeed replaced by an alternative
ontology. Marsilo Ficino (1433–1499) is the
prominent ﬁgure of such a transformation:
according to him, time must be regarded as some-
thing of the world soul and, for this reason, it can
neither be produced by motion nor be an accident
or a property of it. In the Plotinian view that he
promotes, time is “life” itself as it ﬂows from the
activity of the world soul and is tied up to eternity
through a hierarchy of derivative forms of being.
Ficino’s philosophical program is coupled with a
religious agenda, building a new Christianized
cosmology and also, to this extent, facing the
difﬁculties of compromise – as one can see from
the uneasy combination of the linear conception
of Christian time with the cyclical model exposed
in Plato’s Timæus (Prins 2014).
That time is a moving image of eternity does
not mean, however, that it is a mere shadow or
appearance. In the Neoplatonic view, it pertains to
the very structure of things as they are ordered and
divinely produced. Neoplatonic thinkers are eager
to underline what may be the deepest ﬂaw of
Aristotelianism, namely the confusion between
the knowledge of time (how do we come to
know it?) and the ontological perspective (what
is time and what is required for it to be?). Indeed,
that the perception of time implies the existence of
motion does not mean, as Aristotelians contend,
that the very existence of time actually depends on
motion, as Pico della Mirandola (1463–1494)
already suggests (Schmitt 1967). Time is prior to
motion according to Telesio (1509–1588), who
sees it as an independent being having its exis-
tence in oneself and being like a receptacle of
natural movements (Schumann 2004). Along
with Bernardino Telesio and Francesco Patrizi
(1529–1597), Giordano Bruno (1548–1600)
develops a critical approach to Aristotle within a
whole system of thought which, notwithstanding
a few theoretical elements borrowed to the Phys-
ics, has no other goal than taking over the Aristo-
telian paradigm. Bruno’s achievements are
probably the most impressive as regards the the-
ory of time. He views time as a species of duration
and accordingly contends that it should not be
seen as ontologically dependent on motion: it
would be more correct to say that motion is related
to time since we know of duration by looking at
things as they move or change (Hutton 1977). But
Bruno is also the heir of the Copernican revolution
and for this reason he considers that the very
spectacle of heavens cannot be the measure of
time any longer. The destruction of the Ptolemaic
cosmology implies to break with time as referred
to the perfection of the primum mobile and to
favor instead an earthly reference, one point of
view among an inﬁnite variety of others
(Seidengart 2015). According to Bruno’s vision,
there are many times rather than one time, each
local time being one “age,” that is to say, one
aspect of eternity. The Platonic dualism between
time and eternity plays an important role here:
while “eternity” is seen as the genus of time or
absolute duration, “age” is a particular fragment
of it which is determined in connection to things
in motion. Copernic himself did not feel the need
of any updated conception of time, but he clearly
provides a backdrop for understanding Bruno’s
theory as well as future attempts to think of time
as different frommotion and from celestial motion
in particular (Blumenberg 1973; Daniel 1981).
But that some prominent Renaissance thinkers
have chosen the tenuous bond of time with motion
as a common target should not preclude another
fact: namely, that Aristotle’s authority has been
defended throughout the Renaissance period. At
the beginning of the seventeenth century, the
Fathers of Coimbra whose inﬂuence in European
universities is well-known continue to defend the
idea that motion must be prior to time as what
produces time and to focus on Aristotelian issues.
2 Time in Renaissance Philosophy
Innovative and Original Aspects
Now, does the autonomy of time as a concept
mean that time is something real? For instance,
can we hold time as an immaterial entity that ﬂows
without any reference to natural things?
The problem of the reality of time is all the
more vivid that late medieval authors have put
into question the idea that time might be an inde-
pendent being. William Ockham’s razor but also
Duns Scotus’ understanding of “existence” have
led to the claim that time does not exist as some-
thing distinct from the existence of movement
and, as a consequence, that such a distinction has
no necessity, existence and intrinsic duration of a
thing being one and the same. This is of course a
strongly anti-Neoplatonic allegation: if time is not
a property of moving things, it surely cannot be a
property of an unchanging thing as eternity; it
must be intrinsic to things themselves and there-
fore identical with them. Moreover time is not the
right word if we want to speak of what is really
passing by: we should rather speak of “duration.”
Such a de-realization of time where time is made a
property of the individual beings can be traced
back to the Middle Ages, but it is given more
inﬂuence at the end of the Renaissance, philoso-
phers considering “not so much the relation
between a thing and time, than the intrinsic dura-
tion of the thing itself” (Porro 1996). Following
this trend, Francisco Suarez (1548–1617) has
defended the view that duration is distinct from
existence only “ratione” in his Disputatio
50, another anti-Aristotelian idea that has been
challenged by the Fathers of Coimbra (Carvalho
2001). Of course, if duration is intrinsic to things,
it is a problem to explain how time can be mea-
sured. Suarez maintains this possibility with the
notion of an imaginary succession conceived as
homogeneous and inﬁnite to be applied to the
enduring of a thing. What he calls “extrinsic
time” designates time as measured by the refer-
ence to celestial movement and it is to be distin-
guished from the intrinsic account of time (Daniel
1981).
But when questioning the reality of time, one
should not overlook the psychological side of the
problem as it has developed not only in
philosophy (Cassirer 1927) but also in the Renais-
sance literary tradition in order to explain how we
think of time, but also how we think and live in
time (Edwards 2013). An important tendency in
literature and arts leads authors to elaborate the
personal experience of passage and mutability
through “time-centered ﬁctions” as we can see in
Shakespeare who, as he is dependent on the
Augustinian representation of time, holds time as
being both a destroyer and revealer of truth (Hill
1997). This evolution, from the religious notion of
the transience of life to the secular idea that tem-
poral passage is a necessary condition of human
experience, ﬁnd another striking expression in
Montaigne’s Essays who, better than any other
philosopher, underscores that time is the most
fundamental dimension of the self and the think-
ing of time must be linked with the very feeling of
its successive ﬂow.
Nevertheless, the problem remains to deter-
mine how human thought relates to time and this
is quite a polemical matter in the ﬁeld of Renais-
sance debates. Indeed, medieval authors, while
theorizing the notion of a spiritual time proper to
spiritual substances and distinct from the time of
natural substances, have constantly refused to
apply it to human souls (Steel 2001; Blum
2007). When Ficino speaks of “mora,” a notion
close to the medieval concept of discrete duration,
he wants to preserve the human soul’s immortality
and he accordingly endows it with pure spiritual-
ity. The idea of a connection between time and the
soul is not new; it can be found in Aristotle’s
Physics itself (Physics IV, 14). But along with
Averroes’ qualiﬁcation of time as a mind-
dependent attribute, reduced to the mental action
of numbering, it has received wider consideration,
especially in Italy during the course of the six-
teenth century. Some followers of Alexander of
Aphrodisias have attempted to think of intellec-
tion as a temporal reality, produced by a soul
immersed within the natural duration of things.
To this purpose, from Simone Porzio to Francesco
Piccolomini, the Aristotelian concept of “act” is
applied to human thought and sustained by a
renewed description of the psychology of facul-
ties and their mutual relationships. In such a con-
text, time is conceived as an aspect of acts, either
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mental, corporeal, or involving both mind and
body, such as sensation, intellection, or judgment.
Because these acts occupy a very short lapse of
time or are said to be “instantaneous,” they are
sometimes considered to be different components
of one temporal activity rather than being auton-
omous operations or events (Dubouclez 2015).
The old model connecting intellectual activity
with time through the means of imagination, as it
appears for instance in Thomas Aquinas, is chal-
lenged within this materialistic vision of man.
Duration is no more a simple attribute of exis-
tence, but a real passage implying materiality
and mortality.
Impact and Legacy
The legacy of the Renaissance conceptions of
time must be appreciated in the light of the histo-
riographical problem of continuity and disconti-
nuity from Renaissance to modern times. To this
respect, we might say that the Renaissance expla-
nation of time, both Aristotelian and Neoplatonic,
has mixed outcomes.
Indeed, we ﬁnd in Descartes and Pascal a com-
mon attitude, namely the rejection of all philo-
sophical deﬁnitions of time, vividly opposing the
word-by-word method of explanation to be found
in scholastic textbooks and even the very project
of inquiring on time. Descartes in particular holds
that duration and time are notions clear by them-
selves and that philosophical deﬁnitions obscure
them and produce artiﬁcial difﬁculties. In the
meantime, Descartes develops important reﬂec-
tions on the matter of time to be connected with
late scholastic discussions, as debates around the
doctrine of the “continuous creation” indicate.
Pierre Gassendi (1592–1655) refuses the Carte-
sian idea that time is made of divisible parts or
instants and also the conception of an intrinsic
time proper to enduring things and especially to
the ego; he has indeed a realistic conception of
time as a global ﬂow, while Descartes’ distinction
between “duratio” and “tempus” (Principles of
Philosophy, I, 55 and 57) is close to the distinction
between “internal time” and “external time” in
philosophical textbooks (Edwards 2013). But
there are other aspects of the Cartesian doctrine
that look hard to reconcile with the Aristotelian
views: for instance, when Descartes replies to
Arnauld that the same kind of “succession” is to
be found in the thinking substance as in natural
things, he has a uniﬁed conception of time as
ﬂowing in the same manner in natural substances
and in the self (Solère 1997). One might see
Descartes’ theory of time as “temporal dualism”
articulating a physical notion and a psychological
notion of it, time being both a reality to be divided
into parts and an innate idea and attribute of the
thinking substance, announcing the Kantian
notion of “a priori form” in the Critique of Pure
Reason (Waller 2014).
This is obviously one of the most fruitful
aspects of late Renaissance conceptions of time,
namely the prevalence of duration over the Aris-
totelian cosmological approach, leading to the
radical individuation of time as we see in van
Helmont, who conceives of time as a biological
and indivisible principle (Debus 1977). And it
should be underlined that such a conception has
also cosmological consequences of its own.
Indeed, within another tradition that Renaissance
thinkers are supposed to have initiated, namely
the pre-newtonian concept of “absolute time,”
imagination is attributed a central role in the build-
ing of such a temporal reference frame. Renais-
sance scholars have shown that the
“absolutization” of time has to be related to the
development of Copernicanism, providing a
response to the immobilization of the celestial
spheres which is the consequence of the downfall
of the Ptolemaic cosmology (Ariotti 1973), but
also to the Suarezian notion of “imaginary time”
as a means of measuring the intrinsic time or
duration of things, a conception that will be pro-
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